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THE BLENDING OF EAST AND WEST—DEVELOPING A STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE

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World War I brought industrialization into the equation of war between nations. Industrialization gave rise to exponential technical growth and both factors accelerated past contemporary thinking on how to conduct war. The permeation of accelerating technology moves information to the forefront of strategic national calculus. This continuous process of evolution is forcing nations to, again, reevaluate methods used for prosecuting successful conflict in every realm—political, economic, social, and military.

Global access and movement of information creates an interdependence that reaches into almost every facet of society, creating a primary link between control of information and attainment of strategic goals. For the United States, future success mandates a shift in our traditional, western-style thought concerning conflict. This paper explores the evolution of western thought on conflict in the information age. Western philosophy is slowly aligning with holistic eastern philosophy to answer current and anticipated strategic problems. The control of information makes this type of strategy both plausible and relevant to our current and expected environment. What has not changed is the bedrock from which these strategies are derived—theory.

Military theory is a time-tested framework used to educate a leader's judgement. It deals with ideal standards derived from historical lessons that familiarize the decision-maker with the subject of war. Theory transcends time and space, in contrast to its derivative, strategy, which is a product of a given time and space. The framework of theory provides possible or probable explanations of why or how things may occur.

The primary source for the military theorist is history. Jomini wrote "of all the theories on the art of war, the only reasonable one is that which, founded upon the study of military history, admits a certain number of regulating principles, but leaves to natural genius the

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greater part in the general conduct of war without trammeling it with exclusive rules "¹ To correctly identify these regulating principles within history and form them into a theoretical framework represents an essential task for the theorist

Clausewitz was a master at distilling history, at exposing the essential parts of the whole In On War he stated "If theory investigates the subjects which constitute war, if it separates more distinctly that which at first sight seem amalgamated, if it explains fully the property of the means, if it shows their probable effects, if it makes evident the nature of objects, if it brings to bear all over the field of war the light of essentially critical investigation--then it has fulfilled the chief duty of its province "² This investigative inquiry into history familiarizes us with our subject--conflict

Military theory seeks to acquaint us with wartime relationships between what Clausewitz termed the people, the commander and his army and the government ³ Clausewitz believed all are essential in the formulation of theory and the task is "to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets "⁴ The commander and his army are representative of Clausewitz's "creative spirit "⁵ A spirit governed by chance and probability The people, representative of natural force, and the government, representative of reason, form societal, political, and cultural pressures that directly affect this spirit All three play major roles in the application of force and must, therefore, be considered in the formulation of military theory In the end, theory's primary purpose "is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become, as it were, confused and entangled "⁶

Valid military theory remains the root, or framework, for strategy and doctrine, which are reflective of the specific era and environment Leaders at all levels must understand and be

able to determine the validity of the theoretical base from which their strategy and doctrine is derived. National policy makers, planners, and military commanders must understand and capitalize on the benefits of theory to successfully orchestrate the application of force. An excellent example is the 1916-1918 Arab Revolt. This example keenly shows that theory provides a framework for the practitioner to think about solutions to a given situation but it does not offer a clear prescription to any given problem. After initial failures, Major T E Lawrence would realize this, a realization that never came to the Turks or to strategists and commanders embroiled in conflict on the European continent.

In this example, the Arab political objective was “geographical, to extrude the Turk from all Arabic-speaking lands in Asia. It was Arab country, and the Turks were in it that was the issue.”⁷ The main Turkish objective in allying with Germany and Austria-Hungary was to reacquire lost territory in Europe and Africa and to retain territory in SouthWest Asia. It was an objective of restoring the Ottoman Empire to its former greatness. With an understanding of the strategic objectives, Lawrence turned to what he termed “war in its structural aspect”, that of strategy and tactics.⁸ It is at this point where, for Lawrence, theory and current European strategy collide, presenting a dilemma for Lawrence. The current form of prosecuting war, in vogue since the Napoleonic wars, could not be logically applied to the Arab situation. This dilemma caused Major Lawrence to reevaluate his thinking on theory and its relationship to the current situation.

It is at this point that the real analysis begins. The dilemma presented to Major Lawrence drove him to reconsider all that he had read on war, how war was being prosecuted by conventional forces, and how his situation could be remedied by an evaluation of all of the above. Table 1 outlines Major Lawrence’s process of thought.

Major Lawrence realized that the only commonality between the Arab force and the Turkish force was the attempt to fulfill the Clausewitz dictum of compelling the enemy to do your will. He came to realize the danger of applying familiar means (conventional) to the situation at hand. Mao Tse Tung would later capture this danger in the maxim “do not cut your feet to fit the shoes.” Lawrence was brought back to Clausewitz’s first step for the commander and statesman: understand the nature of the war you are about to enter.⁹

Critical Analysis of the Arab Situation¹⁰

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COMMON FOR ALL: Compel enemy to do our will • What are the differences between what is known (theoretical base), what is done (conventional warfighting), and the Arab situation (irregular warfighting)? • What is the nature of the war the Arabs are fighting—What do the Arabs want? British? Turks? • Can the Arabs accomplish their goals with the means available? How? 			
<i>Differences</i>	<i>Conventional Turks</i>	<i>Unconventional Irregular Arabs</i>	<i>Applicable element</i>
Policy/Purpose	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aim provided by Government • Separation of policy and military 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy and military interwoven • Political objective primary 	All
Time	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited by will & economic costs • Operations sequenced to support timeline 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requires a lot of time to erode enemy will • Requires patience of populace 	Biologic Psychological
Military Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overwhelming 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minimal (max at tactical objective) 	Algebraic
Firepower	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More is better 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minimal, only what you can carry 	Algebraic
Space	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Theater geometry required: LOCs, bases of operation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Theater geometry of little significance (except Red Sea Ports) • Desert “like a sea” 	Algebraic
Mass	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Preserve COG and destroy enemy COG 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COG nebulous or unassailable 	Biological Psychological
Mobility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reliance on rail and mechanized transport 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reliance on camel and horse—can go anywhere 	Algebraic Biologic
Diathetics¹¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Replaced by organization discipline 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Critical to success • Required for troops, population & enemy 	Psychological
Center of Gravity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Equipment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Men 	Biological

Table 1

Lawrence understood that the Arab political and military objective were interwoven and focused on the problem of ridding Arabia of the Turks. He defined the capabilities and vulnerabilities of both the Arabs and the Turks. Lawrence would define these through the

analysis of three elements algebraic—"subject to the laws of mathematics, without humanity, biologic—the unpredictable human element and things that would impact on that element, and psychological—the arrangement of the mind, both friendly and enemy, combatants and non-combatants"¹² The combinations of these elements are used to form Lawrence's strategy to overextend the space (algebraic) and minds (biologic/psychological) of the Turks




Figure 1

This example clearly shows theory's relationship to practice. The art of war involves a continuous process of critical analysis (Figure 1) of which theory is but a part. Each piece— theory, history, the current international context and strategic global environment, US interests and policy, and experience—needs to be combined and critically analyzed to come up with relevant strategies and doctrines. The test is conflict. Conflict's end only represents a new starting point for the continuous process of analysis.

Major Lawrence's experience should impart to decision-makers that doctrine is invalidated, not theory. Technology and environments change, and these are the changes that require nations to adjust their doctrinal and strategic approaches to conflict resolution. In the "age of peace," the task is to prevent doctrine or strategy from being too wrong.¹³

The conventional western view of warfare is moving toward obsolescence in the current environment. The primary security strategies of the US, the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS), are regionally focused. The doctrine to properly

support those strategies has been slow to emerge. It is a complex task to move the Department of Defense from what has been a very well defined conventional arena into one that is still filled with unanswered questions, especially concerning current and emerging threats. The picture is clear enough to see a need for a change in doctrine and strategy. A major focus of current US military involvement is represented in US commitments to efforts like Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia, and Kosovo and Columbia are just around the commitment corner. The military recognizes these imperatives and, at the same time, understands the requirement to be prepared for conventional conflict with the likes of Iraq, Iran, North Korea, or an emerging China.

Global responsibilities, economic interdependence, dispersion of trade and resources, all point to a need to support and maintain regional ties. This means a high probability for continued US military involvement in regional flare-ups. The West's focus on technology, mass, and firepower can only offer partial solutions to current and probable unconventional problems. The West is becoming more like the East in that we are beginning to think in more holistic terms. In military operations other than war (MOOTW)¹⁴, information, and unconventional war scenarios there is a requirement to synthesize political, social, information, economic, and military aspects into a concerted campaign. Gone are the days when military and diplomatic operations—while coordinated—had clear distinctions between them. Today, CINCs must be keenly attuned to everything that comprises the fabric in their AOR. A sole focus on military aspects invites a failed outcome for any type of conflict.

This holistic approach mirrors Eastern philosophy and strategy toward conflict. The North Vietnamese *dau tranh* strategy is very representative of this philosophy. *Dau tranh* (Figure 2) is a dualistic strategy composed of *dau tranh chin tri* (political struggle) and *dau*




Figure 2

tranh vu trang (armed struggle) These two elements operate together, indeed, they must operate together, for neither can be successful alone¹⁵ “All actions taken in war—military attack or guerilla ambush, propaganda broadcast or official statement at the conference table, every mission abroad, every decision taken all come within the scope and framework of the two *dau tranhs*”¹⁶ To win against this strategy requires the adversary to fight and win both parts—a requirement overlooked by the United States in the Vietnam War From 1965 to 1973, the US Army did not lose a single important battle Yet, the United States lost the war¹⁷ The United States defeated *dau tranh vu trang* but did not even recognize or admit to the existence of *dau tranh chin tri*¹⁸ The farther the onlooker is from the scene—or the less factual knowledge about the war and the society in which it is fought is available—only serves to

bolster this type of strategy.¹⁹ The flexibility of the strategy makes it a useful model for strategic problem-solving in today's environment—especially in MOOTW and information operations environments. Successful MOOTW requires a number of variables to be met. Among the most

<i>Military Operations Other than War</i>			
Variable	Intent	Success	Failure
Objective	Clear, defined, attainable	Somalia (humanitarian mission)	Somalia (mission creep)
Unity of Effort	Actors include supported nation military, NGO's, diplomats, UN, government agencies	Bosnia (to date)	War on drugs
Legitimacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bolsters supported nation • UN supported and/or US unilateral supported effort (backed by public) 	Panama Malaya (British)	Vietnam
Perseverance	Protracted applications that uphold long term solutions over short term fixes	Malaya (12 yrs)	Vietnam Somalia
Restraint	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Apply appropriate proportional military capability prudently • Restrictive but flexible response • Well thought out ROE 	Bosnia US Army & Marine Corps in Los Angeles riots	Beirut
Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adequate force protection • Superior intelligence (acquisition & assessment) 	Bosnia	Beirut
Table 2			


important are objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint, and security (See Table 2).²⁰

The insidious nature of MOOTW represents a dilemma for the military. One side symbolizes increased involvement for the military in longer term, value-driven, quasi-military missions. This represents the positive side of the equation for an America that wants to lead through action in “do what’s right” scenarios through “threat to US security” scenarios. The negative side of the equation is represented by MOOTW’s unfavorable impact on conventional readiness, operations tempo, and the probability of using committed MOOTW forces in major theater war (MTW) situations.²¹ Additionally, the time for the US to react to MTW is

increased in a situation where forces have to polish warfighting skills to an acceptable level before being collected from various parts of world by limited strategic lift

This is just the tip of the iceberg. For instance, the requirement for involvement in MOOTW and the need to be prepared for large scale conflict, have forced the US Air Force into a cultural change to meet the challenges of an environment characterized by smaller numbers and reduced forward presence. The Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) is the offspring of this change. The negative characteristics of the AEF, to date, are increased temporary duty, accelerated aging of airframes, and decreased retention of critical skill personnel.²² The changing environment is requiring all services to develop new approaches to recruiting, retention, training, and use of reserve and guard forces. While these problems are, in and of themselves, complex, the most vexing problem is defining the nature of each MOOTW and tailoring a plan and a force package that can accomplish the mission. The effort required is a bitter pill for the military to swallow, given the usual long-term, quasi-military nature of these types of missions. The two variables in Table 2 that Westerners are most uncomfortable with are unity of effort—as it pertains to military and non-military contact—and perseverance. Success, however, requires a synergistic mastery of all variables, which is reflective of holistic Eastern approaches to conflict resolution. MOOTW is not the only emerging environment requiring an integrated systems approach, successful information operations (IO) will pose a similar requirement.

IO in conflict—from peaceful competition through war—is a contest of competing systems of organization. In the end, victory is awarded to the side that “gets the best organized, stays the best organized, and can most successfully disorganize the other.”²³ To become the “best organized” for IO requires the United States to view and conduct IO across the spectrum



of conflict²⁴ (Figure 3) IO is much more than computer versus computer. Mastery of this arena requires an adaptation of doctrine and strategy to reflect reality, and reality points to the need for continuous IO campaigns to stay competitive and secure in current and future environments. Favorable outcomes in will require the United States to overcome our ingrained aversion to strategic deception, strategic psyops and covert action. These types of operations will be critical to keeping adversaries off balance.²⁵ Eleventh-century Vietnamese believed a proper force consisted of three armies: the “real” (*Chin Binh*), which was overt, the “hidden” (*Ky Binh*), which was covert, invisible, and the “phantom” (*Nghi Binh*) which didn’t exist at all but which any good general could make his enemy believe existed.²⁶ IO success will rely on the correct blend of the real, hidden, and phantom.

"Never to be undertaken thoughtlessly or recklessly, war was to be preceded by measures designed to make it easy to win. The master conqueror frustrated his enemy's plans and broke up his alliances. He created cleavages between sovereign and minister, superiors and inferiors, commanders and subordinates. His spies and agents were active everywhere, gathering information, sowing dissension, and nurturing subversion. The enemy was isolated and demoralized, his will to resist was broken. Thus without battle his army was conquered, his cities taken and his state overthrown. Only when the enemy could not be overcome by these means was there recourse to armed force, which was to be applied so that victory was gained

(a) in the shortest possible time;

(b) at the least possible cost in lives and effort,

*(c) with infliction on the enemy of the fewest possible casualties."*²⁷

The above excerpt captures Eastern thinking on war and is an excellent template for conducting IO. Focused IO will be most beneficial if carried out across the entire spectrum of conflict depicted in Figure 3. Current focus is on the hostile conflict end of the model, rather than on the gamut of IO. Opportunity for success is increased with a holistic approach to IO. This approach allows the strategist and planner to take advantage of peacetime and crisis environments to shape events, before a necessary response²⁸

The objective in IO is to shape potential adversary action toward US ends without conflict. But if conflict occurs, we need to be prepared to take the opponent(s) down quickly and with little loss. Hence, a major portion of IO should be devoted to peacetime activities designed to deter. This, in turn, better prepares the battlespace for possible hostilities. A true holistic approach requires a coordinated effort between all tools of statecraft directed toward common objectives derived from the NSS, NMS, as well as necessary policy course corrections—an IO *dau tranh*. The concept will be uncomfortable to a Western, democratic society because it will blur current divisions between military and diplomatic action. How well IO is orchestrated and executed in the two dimensions, operating in tandem, will ultimately define success. IO should be the "*ch'i*" operation, always unexpected, strange, or unorthodox²⁹. Sun Tzu said engage with the "*cheng*"

(obvious, conventional), but win with the “*ch’i*” IO allows us to make the *ch’i* more deadly and, thus, more decisive

We are in a period that requires the military to make internal adjustment to meet the challenge of the next ten years, while preparing to meet the emerging peer competitor beyond that period. The challenges for the military are conducting successful MOOTW (long-term, low threat), to remain prepared to fight future small scale, mostly conventional, engagements in either the Middle East or on the Korean peninsula (short term, medium threat), and to be ready to defeat an emerging peer competitor in large scale conflict, most likely China (long term, high threat)³⁰. The goal should be to adapt in such a way that would allow the United States to scrimmage effectively now and, at the same time, be prepared to win the large scale contest 10-20 years out. China will deal with conflict from a holistic approach and the United States should be preparing to do it better. We have the tools, we need the organization.

The West is slowly moving toward an Eastern strategic and doctrinal approach. But we still need to break out of our conceptual paradigms. The main hurdles are overcoming the inherent reluctance to effectively engage in peacetime to prepare the battlefield, and developing organizational ties that would allow planning and execution at a strategic level to be seamless across all the instruments of power. East and West both use the same three “bridges” to prepare for conflict—doctrine, hard thinking, and judgement. These bridges are underpinned by a strong foundation of valid military theory. Genius, it is said, is the ability to synthesize what is already known and apply it to a new situation³¹. T. E. Lawrence, Mao Tse Tung, Ho Chi Minh, and Vo Nguyen Giap did this very effectively. It is time for the United States to synthesize what is known and prepare for the future.

Moving closer to an Eastern philosophy involves developing a balanced concept for accomplishing current and anticipated political and military objectives within existing means. Most change would be organizational and doctrinal. Joint warfighting would be redefined, to encompass the coordinated activities of all instruments of US national power to achieve goals during peace and war. The required cultural change will be the hardest to effect. New strategic concepts would have to be developed to meet the objectives of a holistic approach. The proposed model would continue to follow a shape, respond, and prepare now pathway, but would be oriented more aggressively toward the shape piece of the strategy. Coordination of all instruments would eventually force into place a Joint Requirements Oversight Council that would identify/eliminate redundancies and recommend programs, tasking, and required organizational structures to make the strategy work more effectively.³² We can shape and respond with this strategy now and, with the right organization, do it even better in the future.

When problems do not present themselves clearly, it is harder to know what path to take toward the most effective solutions. We are practicing strategic art and developing a new strategy on a canvas of uncertainty. It is almost sure that we will get it wrong. The key is to develop the strategy in a way that allows for the greatest flexibility.³³ We are developing a roadmap to the future in what Sir Michael Howard calls “ages of peace.” These are periods that can be marked by a very high degree of internal violence, disruption, and revolt.³⁴ Upheavals in Russia, Baltic, Middle East, and Africa all attest to this. Despite our preoccupation with these problems, we must never take our eyes off of the primary target—ensuring United States security by being prepared to win a threatening major international conflict. The primary art of the strategic planner is ascertaining operational requirements—

the frontrunner to technological feasibility and financial capability. The art requires properly identifying (at least in the ballpark) the questions of where, who, when, and how and, then, defining a favorable endstate to meet the challenges embodied in the answers to those questions.

“Some of the greatest changes in the nature of war have not been the result of technological innovation at all. They have been the result of massive political, economic, and social developments in the structure of society as a whole.”³⁵ We are in an era of great change. Globalization, increasing interdependence, increasing flow and control of information all point to the need for change in political, economic and military doctrine. The United States should step up to a holistic strategy that coordinates all elements of national power toward well-defined goals. It is a strategy for the future, it is a strategy that mirrors an increasingly interconnected world. “The annals of military history are replete with states and armies that were victims of change, that did not realize change was upon them, or could not catch up to change before it was too late. The mere realization of a theory is not enough alone to act as a counterweight to such habits. The disjuncture between military theory and military practice, between what is conceived and what is actually done, may be the crucible where military history in the end is made.”³⁶

¹ Baron De Jomini, *Precis de l'Art de la Guerre*, As reprinted in *Roots of Strategy Book 2* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1987), p. 437.

² Carl Maria von Clausewitz, tr. Col. J. J. Graham, *On War* (London 1949), vol. 1, 107-108 as reprinted in Michael E. Howard, *The Theory and Practice of War* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 11.

³ Carl von Clausewitz, tr. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, *On War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 89.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid., p. 132.

⁷ T. E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1938), pp. 191.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 191-192.

- ⁹ Carl von Clausewitz, tr Michael Howard and Peter Paret, *On War* (Princeton NJ Princeton University Press, 1976), p 88
- ¹⁰ Ibid, pp 191-192, T E Lawrence, "The Evolution of a Revolt", *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, (Devon, United Kingdom, Oct 1920), from Ft Leavenworth Combat Studies Institute 4 December 1990 reprint, pp 7-12 and personal notes on differences between unconventional and conventional war from School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft Leavenworth, KS, 1993
- ¹¹ T E Lawrence. "The Evolution of a Revolt", *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, (Devon, United Kingdom, Oct 1920), from Ft Leavenworth Combat Studies Institute 4 December 1990 reprint, p 11 Lawrence defines Diathetics as a science that deals with the adjustment of the spirit to point where it becomes fit to exploit in action
- ¹² T E Lawrence. "The Evolution of a Revolt", *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, (Devon, United Kingdom, Oct 1920), from Ft Leavenworth Combat Studies Institute 4 December 1990 reprint, pp 7-12
- ¹³ Michael Howard, "Military Science in the Age of Peace," *RUSI Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, Vol 119, No 1, March 1974, p 7
- ¹⁴ MOOTW is defined here as military activities conducted during peace and conflict not involving armed clashes between organized forces These include disaster relief, nation assistance, security assistance, drug interdiction, peacekeeping, NEO, peace enforcement, raids, and support for counter insurgency or insurgency
- ¹⁵ Douglas Pike, *PAVN People's Army of Vietnam*, Presido Press, 1986, p 216
- ¹⁶ Ibid, p 217
- ¹⁷ Ibid, p 227 The United States failed to grasp the true nature of the war in which it was involved
- ¹⁸ The dau tranh chun tri dich van program against the US operated on two levels strategic to shape American perception to convince them that victory in Vietnam was impossible by undermining the war at home and abroad, and tactical, to create conditions in the Vietnam AOR to limit full use of American military capability Douglas Pike, *PAVN People's Army of Vietnam*, Presido Press, 1986 p 239
- ¹⁹ Ibid, p 241
- ²⁰ From personal notes on MOOTW from School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft Leavenworth, KS, 1993
- ²¹ It would be unlikely that committed US forces would be pulled from MOOTW missions where we have demonstrated a good deal of resolve (Bosnia or Iraq) Additionally, strategic lift, a limited US resource, would be severely strained if it needed to be divided to support deployment from pre-planned embarkment sites and, at the same time, support removal of forces from several MOOTW areas
- ²² These early indicators will have a severe impact on force capability in the near future Pilots and other critical skill positions have long replacement lead times and incentive programs to retain these skills are having marginal impact The accelerated aging of the fleet is the most critical problem since replacement aircraft in the pipeline will not be one for one replacements—this equates to decreased capability across the air spectrum (primarily lift and fighters)
- ²³ Douglas Pike *PAVN People's Army of Vietnam*, Presido Press, 1986, p 221
- ²⁴ Joseph S Nye Jr, and Admiral William A Owens "America's Information Edge," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April, 1996, p 36 This model is a mix of personal input as well as some of General Sheehan's vision of the IO spectrum combined with elements of Joseph S Nye Jr and Admiral William A Owens description of soft power Soft Power is the ability to achieve desired outcomes in international affairs through attraction rather than coercion It works by convincing others to follow, or getting them to agree to, norms and institutions that produce the desired behavior
- ²⁵ Sun Tzu said all warfare is based on deception where the primary target is the mind of the opposing commander, realizing that it was an indispensable preliminary to battle He also advocated covert action before conflict to gain foreknowledge of the enemy's strategy—with this information war may be won without striking a blow Sun Tzu, tr Samuel B Griffith, *The Art of War*, New York Oxford University Press, 1971, p 41, 144-149
- ²⁶ Douglas Pike, *PAVN People's Army of Vietnam*, Presido Press, 1986 p 225
- ²⁷ Sun Tzu, tr Samuel B Griffith, *The Art of War*, New York Oxford University Press 1971, p 39
- ²⁸ This approach supports the Quadrennial Defense Review, Joint Vision 2010 and the current National Military Strategy goals of shape respond prepare now
- ²⁹ Sun Tzu, tr Samuel B Griffith, *The Art of War*, New York Oxford University Press 1971 p 42-43
- ³⁰ It is the author's opinion that the Middle East and North Korea represent the most likely near term threats to the United States, while China represents the most likely long term threat (10-20 years out)
- ³¹ Douglas Pike, *PAVN People's Army of Vietnam*, Presido Press, 1986, p 217

³² This Joint Requirements Oversight Council would be represented by all germane organizations playing crucial roles in strategic planning, execution, and authorization of the elements of the new strategy

³³ Michael Howard, "Military Science in the Age of Peace," *RUSI Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, Vol 119, No 1, March 1974, p 7, 8

³⁴ Ibid, p 4

³⁵ Ibid, p 8

³⁶ Roger J Spiller. *The Theory and Practice of Post-Industrial Conflict*, unpublished. Ft Leavenworth KS US Army Command and General Staff College, 1992, p 29

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